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ABSTRACT 
 
What constitutes unacceptable client behaviour in competitive tendering is considered 
based on theoretical, legislative and moral considerations.  A range of malpractices is 
then identified through the examination of reported abuses.  Finally, a case study is 
presented which illustrates some of these practices and the difficulties faced by those 
affected in offering resistance.  It is suggested that a practical solution may found by 
requiring clients to make a more direct contribution to tenderers costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the construction industry, tendering today provides the predominant means by 
which clients1 obtain services to execute a specified scope of work.  The construction 
industry is consists of a set of markets that form a very competitive system, so 
competitive that it has been said to be one of the closest systems to perfect 
                                            
1 The term 'client' is synonymous with 'owner', 'principal' and 'proprietor'. 
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competition (Runeson, 1996) – in many markets so close as to be almost identical.  
The end product, and therefore the services required, is identical for all suppliers 
(tenderers); there are many suppliers each of whom is responsible for only a very 
small part of the total market output; there is little or no collusion between suppliers; 
and buyers and sellers have a good knowledge of the construction prices prevailing 
generally in the market.  No supplier has enough market power to set the price above 
the market price, as they communicate their offers to the buyers through competitive 
tenders.  However, the system with competitive tendering does leave some room for 
opportunism. Unfair opportunism2 is discouraged by practice codes and legislation 
with the intention of ensuring both probity and equity among all parties involved as 
well as enabling the client to obtain a competitive price.  There have, however, been 
reports that the tendering and selection processes used by government agencies, for 
example, are inconsistent, lacking accountability, unfair, inequitable and lacking 
transparency (ISC, 1997:50) 
 
This paper examines opportunistic aspects of the tendering process in practice.  In 
contrast with previous work (Daniels, 1978; Gyles, 1993; IQS Sussex Branch 
Committee, 1979; Lee, 1990; McCaffer, 1976; Moyles, 1973; Ray et al, 1999; Sheldon, 
1982; Whittaker, 1970; Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore, 2000), which concentrated on 
the contractor, the behaviour of the client is scrutinised in relation to what is 
acceptable practice and general impact on the procurement process as a whole. 
 
 
 
                                            
2 'Opportunisim' is used here in the sense of Williamson (1985) to denote "self-interest with guile' 
where, more often than not, opportunism involves subtle forms of deceit - both active and passive.  But 
   3
THE THEORY OF COMPETITION 
 
Competition is a match or trial of ability - "the rivalry in strife for the same object" 
(Macdonald, 1978).  In the business environment, competition is defined as the 
commercial rivalry between business concerns (Adam, 1985).  Competition is also 
generally regarded as being the key to the success of capitalist and mixed economies 
(Gilpin, 1986).  
 
In an ideal competitive situation, each trader may freely accept or reject the terms 
offered, (ie offer or accept tenders).  All participants are free to pursue gain and avoid 
loss, motivation based on self-interest being socially and politically acceptable (Gilpin, 
1986).  It is obvious, however, that the opportunistic pursuit of self-interest is 
incompatible with conventional social values.  As Muller (1993:101) observes, citing 
Adam Smith, "If the pursuit of self-interest prompted us to violate the person and 
property of others, this natural egoism would bring about the dissolution of society ... a 
descent into the Hobbesian state of nature in which each man is the enemy of every 
other".  Smith, in fact, was well aware that the potential moral benefits of commercial 
society were threatened by opportunism within commercial society itself.  "Indeed, the 
pursuit of individual wealth might lead to consequences which threatened the very 
virtues upon which society depends" (Muller, 1993:137), exposing "... the 
commonwealth to many gross disorders and shocking enormities" (p148).  Muller 
further comments on the lack of leisure time and ability to conceive of "any generous, 
noble or tender sentiment..." (p149) - cited by critics of capitalism (including Karl Marx) 
as testimony to the alienating effects of capitalism. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
it also includes more blatant activities such as lying, stealing and cheating. 
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The Smithian solution to this was to show how self-interest can provide an acceptable 
psychological basis for social institutions, if properly structured within a suitable 
legislative framework, the intention being to "maximise economic benefits by 
preventing the circumvention of the market" as well as "maximising the moral benefits 
of commercial society by fostering institutions to counteract the characteristic moral 
hazards of that society" (Muller, 1993: 139).  The legislation needed was seen to be a 
matter requiring great care and discretion, with risks of either over or under regulation. 
 
Of course, much has happened since Smith and the current preoccupation is with 
non-legislative solutions to the problem of opportunism through the development of 
more trusting relations between participants.  That this follows a lengthy period in 
which planning was pursued as an equally promising solution is one of the central 
insights of Williamson's (1985) transaction cost economics (TCE) which seeks to 
account for all three approaches.  TCE, however, is essentially concerned with the 
economics of being in contracts rather than the economics of getting into contracts 
and so has only limited application to the process of tendering.  What is of interest 
here though is TCE's treatment of the different types of legislative requirements of 
each system.  Thus TCE holds that planning assumes there is a potential for 
significant opportunism but minimal uncertainty and therefore that a completely 
predefined legal framework is possible as well as desirable; while cooperation (eg., 
through alliancing) assumes a significant level of uncertainty but minimal opportunism 
and therefore that a simple pledge to act currently in a 'joint profit-maximising manner' 
and seek only fair returns will suffice.  Where both uncertainty and opportunism are 
accepted as significant issues, TCE has little to say other than in situations where the 
parties have continuing mutual interests.  Where there are no continuing mutual 
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interests (such as is usually the case on construction contracting), it is noted that 
"fraud and contract deceits are deterred by court ordering" (Moore, 1992:175). 
 
For fair and healthy competition to exist, therefore, requires the compliance of the 
participants to prevent practices, which restrict, distort or prevent competition.  From 
Smith to Porter it has been understood that each competitor's self-interest is best 
served by somehow avoiding having to compete at all, and that the main (only?) 
legislative need is to restrict anti-competitive behaviour.  This is currently controlled 
through legislation (eg., Anti-trust laws in the US; the Competition Act in the UK).  
 
However, the degree, character, and intensity of competition in markets is strongly 
influenced by the nature of the participants and their bargaining power, in fact, 
microeconomic theory may be said to be a theory of the implications of market power 
(eg Lipsey, 1963) 
 
 
CONSTRUCTION TENDERING 
 
The origin of construction tendering in UK dates back to the early eighteenth century, 
where it was used for the procurement for barracks during the Napoleonic wars 
(Thompson, 1967).  It remains more or less unchanged today.  Even in its infancy, the 
construction tendering process was believed to impose both probity and competition 
on tenderness.  Later, the tendering process was further developed and adapted by 
the British Civil/Construction industry as the process to ensure that keen competition 
among tenderers was reflected in the outcome of the process. 
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Today, the government continues to be the single largest consumer of building 
services in Australia (Budd, 1999:3), and the expectations are that the government will 
approach the process of reviewing and awarding tenders in a manner that is both 
professional and transparent to the industry.  On one hand, the government seeks to 
adhere to its own stipulated terms and procedures to ensure the probity of the 
process.  On the other hand, it seeks to inject flexibility into the tender process, not 
only to obtain the most competitive price but also to implement desired competition 
and development policies.  Price competition is de rigour as it ensures accountability 
for public money (eg., Hilmer, 1993).  Governments therefore focus heavily upon price 
for awarding contracts (ISC, 1997:50) with their agencies predominantly accepting the 
lowest tender price for building projects (Merna and Smith, 1990). 
 
The construction industry is noted for the competitive attitude of its firms.  
Relationships within the industry tend to be competitive rather than cooperative – even 
between buyers and sellers.  This culture, it is argued, arises from the nature of its 
Smithian system of contractor selection and price formation.  Contracting parties live 
and die (in a commercial sense) according to terms of bargains that are struck; 
therefore the commercial fate of a project is dictated by positions and statements 
adopted during the tendering stage (Dorter and Sharkey 1998:1011).  In addition, the 
project-to-project focus of the construction process results in the predominance of 
short-term relationships between clients and contractors that tends to exacerbate 
opportunistic behaviour 3. 
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THE CODE 
 
NPWC/NBCC (1990) and CIDA (1993) have recommended strategies for the manner 
in which tendering is conducted within the building and construction industry to ensure 
fairness.  NPWC/NBCC recommended the establishment of a Standard Code of 
Tendering imposing ethical and commercial obligations upon clients, contractors and 
consultants in turn ensuring the tendering process remained fair, equitable and free 
from manipulation.  The recommendation from both NPWC/NBCC (1990) and CIDA 
(1993) was further developed into the Australian Standard Code of Tendering AS4120 
(Standards Association of Australia, 1994). 
 
Essentially, the code is intended to encourage honesty and fairness; the duty of all 
parties is to act honestly and in good faith.  The general underlying principles of the 
code insofar as clients are concerned are that: 
• Clients shall have regard to the cost of tendering 
• Clients shall arrange for all necessary project funding 
• Parties shall not engage in improper arrangements.   
• Tender documents shall clearly specify the client’s requirements  
 
Particular client’s obligations during the pre-tender stage are to:  
• ensure the project brief is clear and specific, adequately defining the project 
• select a procurement strategy best suited to the project  
• arrange for adequate finance to complete the project 
                                                                                                                                          
3 As Smith says  "Where people seldom deal with one another, we find that they are somewhat 
disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the injury which it 
does to their character (reputation)" (LJ(B) p538-9). 
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• prepare complete tender documentation reflecting the style of procurement 
strategy 
• where appropriate, to apply pre-qualification criteria for the selection of suitable 
firms invited to tender 
and at tender stage to: 
• select a tendering method, having regard to the costs associated with tendering 
• answer all questions during the tender period, all answers to queries must be 
circulated to all tenderers 
• avoid amendments to the tender documents 
becoming, at post-tender stage to: 
• arrange for the safeguard and security of all tender submissions upon receipt 
• discard a tender which does not comply with the tender documents 
• consider the tender most advantageous to the client for acceptance 
 
 
PROBITY  
 
The issue of probity is a major concern in all tender processes, particularly in the 
government/public sector (Budd, 1999:1).  In general, probity involves the client 
ensuring that the processes of calling tenders and evaluating responses is fair, and 
complies with the conditions of the Code.  From a government perspective, there are 
important public policy reasons why tenders must be evaluated fairly and strictly in 
accordance with the requirements of its Code (Budd, 1999:1): governments in general 
need to be seen by the industry and the public alike to be acting in a business like 
fashion; and to preserve confidence and ensure continued support for government 
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projects.  The laws relating to competition combined with purchasing policy also 
operate to impose stringent requirements on government bodies following the tender 
process (Budd, 1999:5).  In particular, there is a risk of incurring civil liability towards 
disappointed tenderers, in the event that tender evaluation procedures are not 
followed (Dean, 1996:33).  Clients are required to demonstrate due care with 
representations made in tender documents and tender meetings.  If the 
representations prove to false, the contractor may incur substantial loss in law.  
 
 
REPORTED CLIENT ABUSES 
 
The tender process is vulnerable to manipulation by all parties.  It is protected to some 
extent by the general legislation against gross misdemeanours such as fraud, and by 
more special legislation against anti-competitive behaviour such as collusion.  The 
Code currently falls outside the legislative framework, rather offering suggestions of 
appropriate individual behaviour - leaving the "invisible hand" of market competition to 
provide the long-term economic solution. 
 
In concentrating on pre-contract client behaviours that contrast with the Code, industry 
reports and research suggest the existence of three major and distinct areas of activity 
comprising Standard Industry Contracts, Tender Review and Award, and Non-
Conforming Tenders as described below.  
 
 
Standard Industry Contracts 
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A number of standard forms of contract have been developed to aid in the contract 
drafting and overall formation process.  These are intended to provide a maximum 
degree of commonality between individual contracts to reduce the amount of time 
needed for their understanding, enable a body of experience in their use to be 
developed, and provide an opportunity for their gradual improvement in equitable 
provision over time.  Familiarity with the standard forms therefore is expected to 
reduce the amount of time and risk involved for tenderers.  Clearly, for the intention to 
be realised, it is necessary for amendments to the standard form to be kept to a 
minimum.  Where, such amendments are unavoidable (eg., due to the special 
characteristics of the project, project team, etc), the Code recommends they be clearly 
noted and the tenderers' attention drawn to the amendments (NPWC/NBCC, 
1990:10).  Gross amendments alter the base risk allocation of the contract (Budd, 
1990:7)4.  In some circumstances clients develop their own suite of general conditions 
of contract which are drafted and prepared by the client's lawyer.  For instance, Telstra 
corporate property services have their own general conditions of contract.  The 
contract generally, is not modelled on any standard industry form of contract and 
reputedly increases the contractor's exposure to additional costs.  It is necessary, 
therefore, for the tendering contractors to review the contract in detail to ensure risk is 
adequately priced, this adds to the costs of tendering also uncertainty 
 
 
Tender Review and Award  
 
                                            
4 An example is where an architect redrafted clauses of a standard form of contract by pasting the 
revised clauses over the top of the original clauses.  A dispute later arose over the interpretation of the 
amended clauses.  In the ensuing legal proceedings (Taylor Woodrow v The Minister for Health (1978) 
AFCC 104), the presiding judge commented, famously, that “...the departure from traditional 
   11
The tendering and selection processes used by government agencies are reported to 
be inconsistent, lacking accountability, unfair, inequitable and lacking transparency 
(ISC, 1997:50).  For example, although legally bound to do so under the tendering 
contract, clients often fail to communicate to the industry the manner in which the 
tenders are to be reviewed. 
 
 
Non-Conforming Tenders 
 
A regular criticism of competitive tendering is the lack of flexibility provided for 
tenderers to display their efficiency and innovate (Budd, 1999:4).  For many 
government clients any tender that does not comply exactly with the tender 
documents is regarded as a non-conforming tender and is therefore discarded, with 
the Code requiring these to be identified in a tender report, together with the reasons 
for their non-conformity.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that both public and private 
sector clients utilise non-conforming tenders for the means of further negotiation, that 
is, the tenderer is contacted after the official opening of bids and requested to either 
amend or withdraw the offer.  In some instances, the tenderer merely removes the 
qualifications on the tender thereby making it a fully compliant tender.  This practice is, 
of course, a breach of implied contract between the client and tenderers.  A better 
practice is for tenderers to submit a conforming tender and an alterative offer, 
although this has the disadvantage of increasing tendering costs. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
terminology in amending the well known variation clause… is anomalous and deplorable.  It is like 
tipping an entirely gratuitous truck load of manure into this already sufficiently muddied stream” 
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CASE STUDY 
 
The case study project was selected as it provides a practical demonstration of many 
of the client influenced aspects of the tendering process.  It is, however, typical of 
many projects where clients are actively involved in the process.  For reasons of 
confidentiality, the project studied is referred to as project X and the client and 
contractor given aliases to obscure their respective identities.  All dates and figures, 
however, are factual. 
 
Project X involved the refurbishment of a foodcourt located within a prominent retail 
centre.  It was envisaged that the work would be executed in a staged program to 
ensure that the foodcourt remained operational at all times while the retail centre was 
open to the public.  This requirement would therefore necessitate the contractor to 
work after normal working hours. 
 
Initially, the client (referred to here as Daylight Developments) requested an Architect 
and Quantity Surveyor to prepare a sketch design and relevant costing of a scheme 
for the foodcourt development.  The Architect and Quantity Surveyor had already been 
involved in other stages of the retail development and therefore had sufficient 
understanding and historical data concerning the project.  Daylight Developments 
informed the foodcourt tenants of the development options under consideration.  The 
tenants were dissatisfied with the proposed developments and a solicitor representing 
several of the tenants forwarded a letter to the developer voicing their objections.  
Daylight Developments ignored the letter of objection and proceeded with the plans to 
develop the project. 
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The Quantity Surveyor prepared a preliminary estimate based on a single sketch, floor 
plan, and a detailed briefing session with the Architect.  An indicative estimated 
construction cost of $1,200,000 was reported to Daylight Developments on 13 
February 1996.  The estimate included for escalation up to December 1997.   
 
Daylight Developments were dissatisfied with the design and the overall response of 
the foodcourt tenants and postponed the project until further notice.  Daylight 
Developments did not comment at this stage on the acceptability or otherwise of the 
Quantity Surveyor’s estimate. 
 
The tenants then threatened legal action on the basis that Daylight Developments had 
misinformed them of their intentions and that this amounted to deceptive conduct as 
defined in the Trade Practices Act (Pengilley et al, 1990).  As a means of settling this, 
Daylight Developments offered a tenancy leasing incentive to all tenants of $1000/m2 
of net rentable area (NRA) to refit their tenancy.  All the tenants accepted this.  
However, Daylight Developments did not negotiate a formal contractual agreement 
with the tenants stating the incentive was instead of the proposed foodcourt 
development.  The total cost of the leasing incentives to Daylight Developments was 
$275,000. 
 
Daylight Developments continued to absorb pressure from the foodcourt tenants after 
the leasing incentives were provided.  Later, in February 1999 Daylight Developments 
decided to continue with the foodcourt development.  The Quantity Surveyor and 
Architect were contacted and requested to commence a redesign of the foodcourt in a 
manner similar to the design presented to Daylight Developments in February 1996 at 
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a total estimated construction cost of $1,200,000.  The Quantity Surveyor responded 
to the request and noted that the estimate included for project escalation only up to 
December 1997 and therefore the budget would need to be recalculated in line with 
current market rates. 
 
The Quantity Surveyor recalculated the estimated construction cost of the February 
1996 and reported a figure of $1,325,000, whereupon Daylight Developments 
requested the Quantity Surveyor and Architect produce a revised design that would 
reflect the original estimated cost of $1,200,000.  The design was subsequently 
revised and the Quantity Surveyor reported the revised estimated construction cost of 
$1,080,000 on 7 February 1999. 
 
Daylight Developments reviewed the revised design and estimated cost commenting 
favourably about the overall design concept; however, Daylight Developments queried 
the accuracy of the Quantity Surveyor’s estimate.  The Quantity Surveyor reviewed 
the estimate and confirmed that the estimated construction cost was correct.   
 
Daylight Developments were adamant the estimate was incorrect and requested the 
Quantity Surveyor to submit a detailed elemental breakdown of the estimate.  The 
Quantity Surveyor refused to supply Daylight Developments with this.  Instead, the 
following breakdown of costs was provided:  
 
Cost Centre $ 
  
Net Construction Cost 860,360 
Preliminaries/Margins/Overheads 94,640 
Gross Construction Cost $ 955,000 
  
F.F&E (Directly Sourced and Fixed by Daylight) 85,000 
Project Contingency 40,000 
   15
Estimated Construction Cost (7/2/99)  
(Excl. Escalation and GST) 
 
$ 1,080,000 
 
 
Daylight Developments requested another professional Quantity Surveying firm 
compile an estimate of construction cost for the project.  A cost of $1,100,000 was 
reported to Daylight Developments on 15 February 1999.  Daylight Developments still 
considered the estimated construction cost excessive and contacted an experienced 
contracting firm who had completed a number of projects for Daylight Developments in 
the past.  The contractor, referred to herein as On Time Constructions (OTC) were 
given two days to compile an estimate for the project.   
 
OTC reported an estimated construction cost of $1,250,000 to Daylight Developments 
on 28 February 1999.  Daylight Developments were unhappy with this and demanded 
that OTC revise the estimate.  Two weeks later OTC reported a revised estimated cost 
of $1,030,145 (which compared favourably to the Quantity Surveyor’s Estimate of 
$1,040,000 plus $40,000 contingency). 
 
Daylight Developments called a meeting with the Architect, Quantity Surveyor and 
OTC in which all parties were advised that the project budget to redevelop the 
foodcourt was to be $750,000 and the design must be modified to reflect this.  In 
addition, OTC and the Quantity Surveyor were requested to work as a “Team” to bring 
the project back to this budget. 
 
After numerous meetings and discussion between the Architect, OTC and Quantity 
Surveyor, the design was subsequently revised.  However, its integrity could not be 
maintained at the anticipated budget cost of $750,000.  The Quantity Surveyor 
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reported that major design omissions and revised quality expectations would need to 
be made to reduce the budget by the requested 44%.  Daylight Developments 
rejected the report and invited OTC to submit a tender for negotiation with the Quantity 
Surveyor. 
 
OTC submitted a tender dated 7 April 1999 totalling $946,148 excluding F.F&E, which 
compared with the Quantity Surveyor’s estimate of  $955,000.  Daylight developments 
requested OTC to omit a number of items detailed on the contract documentation and 
advised OTC, in writing that these items were to be supplied and fixed directly by 
Daylight Developments.  OTC resubmitted their tender 23 April 1999 of $917,207 with 
a qualification deeming the offer was valid for the next thirty days only (Valid to 23 
May 1999). 
 
Daylight Developments did not accept the figure submitted by OTC and believed a 
more competitive figure could be procured through tendering the work to similar sized 
contractors.  Four contractors were invited to submit a tender for the same scope of 
work as OTC’s original tender dated 7 April 1999.  The tender results received on 26 
May 1999 were as follows: - 
 
Contractor $ 
  
OTC Constructions – No Qualifications 942,302 
  
Contractor A – Qualifications 958,343 
  
Contractor B – No Qualifications 1,029,000 
  
Contractor C – No Qualifications 1,042,135 
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Daylight Developments rejected all of the tenders and contacted OTC to accept their 
tender of $917,207 (23 April 1999) on the basis that the thirty day period had only just 
expired and it would be unreasonable for OTC to enforce this time bar.  OTC did not 
enforce the time bar and commenced construction within two weeks of acceptance. 
 
The project was completed 11 August 1999 at a final construction cost of $1,081,494 
an approximate budget over-run of $1,500. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The main client breaches of the Codes and law in general include: 
• resorting to market testing without a bona fide intention to proceed with the project 
• failure to acknowledge the costs associated with tendering 
• repudiation of an implied contract with invited tenders that the most advantageous 
price would be accepted. 
 
Clearly in this case, the client was exposed to legal action from unsuccessful 
tenderers.  However, at no time did anyone object to the manner in which the tender 
and review processes were conducted - even after the original negotiated tender was 
rejected and re-accepted after the lapse of the validation period - despite the Code 
urging all parties to refuse to condone behaviour that is unacceptable.  Thus, all the 
participants in the case study, by tacit acceptance of the client's actions, effectively 
condoned the behaviour of the client.  
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The reason is that all are fiercely competing for projects and any objections to client 
behaviour is seen as being likely to place them in disfavour and jeopardise the 
chances of further work.  The bargaining power of the client may appear 
overwhelming.  Faced with this prospect, there is no means of resistance by the 
tenderers as "it is better to be exploited in business than not to be in business at all".  
Or, as Saul (1981:271) somewhat cynically puts it "... the only truly ethical companies 
are going out of existence". 
 
One of the most significant aspects of the study is the apparent failure of the client to 
recognise the costs associated with tendering.  Of course, in pure financial terms, 
clients have no need to be concerned with this as such costs are not passed on 
directly.  From an industry-wide perspective, however, the costs are necessarily 
passed on indirectly by the contractors' recovery of overheads through higher prices 
generally.  To attempt to reduce overheads by inducing better-behaved clients is, it is 
submitted, something that can only be achieved by penalising the individual for the 
benefit of all.  Although clearly a counter philosophy to that of free competition, it is 
worthy of examination as a means of maintaining fairness.  In other words, the 
question is 'How can we change the rules of the game" to solve the problem?  The 
obvious starting point is for the client to bear, at least partially, the cost of tendering, 
as this should certainly encourage a more efficient process.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Competitive tendering provides the vehicle by which a client may obtain offers from 
the “market” to execute a specified scope of work.  It is widely believed that the 
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tendering process will ensure both probity and equity among all parties involved in the 
process ultimately leading to the client obtaining the most competitive price.  The 
pursuit of the most competitive price is responsible for the continued competitive 
culture existing in the construction industry.  The competitive culture has always 
existed due to the differing business interests of all parties involved within the 
construction process.  The process breeds a project-project focus, that is, short term 
relationships between clients and contractors.  This, together with the competitive 
tendering system itself, encourages self-interest to dominate which, in turn, 
exacerbates the difficulty in maintaining the fairness of the tender process whenever 
there are differences in bargaining powers. 
 
From the research conducted, it is evident that clients are not always adhering to the 
guidelines and underlying principles enforced in the Code.  This leads to the question 
whether the Code in itself is, or ever can be, sufficient to prevent malpractices.  But if 
the Code cannot bring about acceptable behaviour, what is then required? 
 
The case study illustrated the realities of tendering and the difficulties faced by those 
in the market place.  The case study demonstrated a failure of the client to behave, or 
encourage others to behave, in a socially acceptable manner.  Moreover, it showed 
that, in the face of the client's bargaining power, resistance is impracticable if not 
impossible.  The root of the problem is self-interest.  It is self-interest that justifies each 
client's exploitative behaviour and each contractor's self-interest (ie., staying in 
business) that justifies it being suffered.  Yet self-interest is the very basis of the ideal 
of free competition.  This has, of course, not gone unnoticed, and even the ideal of 
perfect competition has its opponents (eg., Stigler, 1966; Richardson, 1964).  These 
maintain that perfect competition, even if realisable, would be unworkable, and point to 
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the fact that those markets which approximate most closely the supposed market 
structure (eg., some international commodity markets) “exhibit cronic and wasteful 
instability” (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1980).  Competition, it would seem, in both theory 
and practice within the industry, fails to reward effort, loyalty and continuity (Hinds 
1998:5). 
 
An alternative, more optimistic, approach was suggested by Smith himself.  "In the 
areas in which government activity was necessary to maintain the prerequisites of 
market activity or to counteract the negative consequences of the market, Smith tried 
to design institutional means to channel private interests to favourable public 
outcomes" (p153).  "When the market is judged to be an inadequate mechanism, the 
Smithian predisposition is to design structures of incentives which create some of the 
disciplining effects of consumer choice upon the providers of public services" (p199).  
It would be most in keeping with the spirit of Smith's work to recognise the reality of 
disharmonies of private and social costs [as noticed by Pigou], so that the real costs 
are borne by those who make and consume the commodities which create the 
negative by-products" (p200).  To do this, Smith tried to devise market-like 
mechanisms that subjected providers to the discipline of competition and tied 
payments to the actual performance of services (p152) - eg., a flat rate for judges.  
One contemporary application of this method is the imposition of a tax on polluters 
equal to the cost imposed by polluter on others" (p200).  In the case of construction 
tendering, it is suggested the costs of abortive tendering be borne more directly by the 
client, being the major recipient of the benefits accruing. 
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